Fiz questão de postar esta matéria da Aviation Week, porque acho que eles foram direto ao ponto. Trataram de coisas, que ficam inibidas, ou sequer são pensadas pela midia internacional, que termina por ficar na superfície, fazendo com que as notícias fiquem num festival de mesmices enjoativo, que nada de bom acrescenta. Esta é a minha opinião.
Congratulations guys
MH370 Search Coordination Lapses Echo Global Issues
By Adrian Schofield, Jeremy Torr, and Bradley
Perrett
Source: AWIN First
The hunt for Malaysia
Airlines Flight MH370 has thrown a harsh light on the fragile nature of
internal and cross-border relationships in Southeast Asia, as a lack of
coordination hampered both detection of the flightpath and response to its
disappearance.
The miscommunication among
various agencies and countries during the MH370 search has been almost farcical
at times and is likely to prompt changes in how various organizations
collaborate during emergencies. It took tragic incidents to spur reform in
other places, too, such as the U.S. after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Cross-border cooperation is a tough nut to crack, but improved civil-military
coordination is something for which many states are striving—with different
degrees of success.
Although the countries
involved in the initial MH370 search are nominally part of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (Asean), the lines of direct contact at most levels
between them are strained by strong national interests. The glacial progress of
movement to an Asian open-skies commercial agreement illustrates this well.
While Malaysian Transport
Minister Hishammudin Hussein says the level of cooperation between nations has
been “unprecedented,” the fact that Thailand’s military tracked MH370 yet did
not communicate the data—“because it wasn’t asked,” it said—indicates serious
problems. Thai military radar noted a “blip” that could have been MH370, but
this was not even mentioned to any Thai authorities outside the military for 10
days.
More than 40 hr. after the
disappearance, the Malaysian chief of police told media that “not every country
whose nationals were onboard has responded to requests for information.”
Foot-dragging by Indonesia
when asked for permission for search-and-rescue aircraft to overfly its
territory also highlights what are deep and enduring suspicions of neighboring
countries’ intentions when conducting any kind of operations across borders.
The fact that the boundary
areas of early search efforts crossed maritime sectors that are under dispute
by some of the key players—China, Vietnam and the Philippines—made full and
immediate disclosure of the radar data, surveillance levels and intelligence
capability less than likely.
Another major issue in
Southeast Asia is the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the various services of
specific countries. The army, air force, navy, internal security agencies and
air navigation service providers (ANSP) do cooperate, but often not as closely
as elsewhere in the world.
Although Malaysian military
radar tracked a then-unidentified aircraft across its airspace early on March
8, this was not linked into the investigation by the civilian aviation
authorities for almost two days. The Thai military’s delay in disclosing radar
data to Thai civil authorities also highlights internal issues.
Problems unveiled by the
MH370 response are not necessarily new, nor are they unique to Southeast Asia.
For example, ANSPs around the world have been attempting to address the issue
of civil-military cooperation for many years. Because civil and defense
agencies have different objectives for surveillance, they often operate
separately from each other. National security concerns keep defense
surveillance data from being used by civil agencies, and vast amounts of
airspace are closed to civil air traffic due to defense requirements. In India,
for example, this can be as much as 35% of total airspace.
However, efforts are
underway globally to improve the civil-military disconnect, and in some
countries major improvements have been made. The flexible use of airspace (FUA)
concept is being applied to military airspace zones, allowing commercial
traffic to fly through these areas when they are not being used by the
military. While surveillance data-sharing by defense agencies is still not
common, many ANSPs have established multi-agency teams to ensure cooperation
during crises, and defense representatives are often stationed at civil air
traffic management (ATM) centers.
In a recent speech, Jeff
Poole, director general of the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization, drew
attention to constraints caused by military airspace restrictions in the Middle
East, where only about half the airspace is available for civil traffic.
Poole notes that in Europe,
the U.S. and certain parts of Asia, the progressive opening of military
airspace to civilian operations “has been managed responsibly to the benefit of
both sides.” This has led to FUA, shorter routes, cost savings and fewer
delays. “The case is clear, and we are working hard with states to accelerate
progress,” says Poole.
The main platform for
efforts to improve civil-military cooperation globally is the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which crafted a set of policy principles
and guidelines on the issue in 2011 that is still regarded as the standard.
ICAO has been holding meetings in various parts of the world to promote these
concepts. States “will benefit from a strong commitment to civil-military
collaboration,” which has the potential to increase safety, airspace capacity,
national security and operational efficiency, the policy document says.
ICAO advocates the exchange
of surveillance and flight identification data between military and civil ATM
units, direct communication lines, and even joint airspace design and
technology procurement. Better coordination procedures as well as improved
communications technology will play a key role, it asserts.
The U.S. has one of the
most sophisticated interagency coordination networks, although it was found to
have had flaws during the response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
The commission established to assess the response identified several areas
where communication between agencies was poor. This has now changed, with
multiple joint entities working more effectively at operational and strategic
levels.
One of the most important
of these is the Domestic Events Network, a multi-agency teleconferencing system
that allows instant communications in the event of airspace violations, failure
of aircraft to communicate with controllers and any suspicious aircraft
identified as “tracks of interest.” FAA and military representatives are posted
at each other’s facilities, and the FAA shares radar data with the North
American Aerospace Defense Command.
Canada also has some of the
best interagency cooperation. ANSP Nav Canada has an agreement with the
Department of National Defense allowing it to use surveillance data from the
North Warning System radar chain. Nav Canada has used this to extend its own
coverage area off the country’s northeast coast. The two agencies exchange
domestic radar feeds, and Nav Canada also exchanges surveillance data with the
FAA.
Enhanced civil-military ATM
coordination is a major element of Europe’s Single European Sky plan, and there
is a strong military presence at Eurocontrol headquarters. Among European
nations, Germany has an almost completely integrated civil and military ATM
system, at least at the en-route level.
Meanwhile, Australia is
pursuing joint airspace design and technology procurement, and its proposed new
ATM system, known as OneSky, will be used by both civil and military operators.
Thailand is taking a smaller step in this direction. As part of its ATM upgrade
project, ANSP Aerothai plans to supply to the Royal Thai Air Force a work
station compatible with its new system to improve coordination.
The Australian example is
significant, given its prominent role in the search for MH370. Australia has
not said how closely its military surveillance branches have been involved in
the MH370 operation, although Prime Minister Tony Abbott said, “all of our
agencies that could possibly help in this area are scouring their data.”
The Royal Australian Air
Force and other armed services as well as possibly the national
signals-intelligence service seemingly became all the more effective in the
search due to information from other countries telling them roughly where to
look. When tasked with looking in the southern Indian Ocean, the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) says it “defined a possible search area with
information available to us from a range of sources both nationally and
internationally.”
AMSA did not disclose the
providers of the information, but a conceivable military source would be
signals-intelligence systems, which can locate and track aircraft from their
radio emissions. High frequencies and long ranges challenge the process,
however, especially for terrestrial receivers.
Satellites, with huge
fields of view, are also used for the purpose. Australia has no signals-intelligence
satellites but probably gets much information from those operated by the U.S.
Civil-military cooperation
is far less of an issue within China, where the military is likely to take the
lead in any major search operation. The Air Traffic Management Bureau of the
Civil Aviation Administration of China operates secondary radars and some
primary radars, but it would have every reason to supply its information to the
air force. Moreover, the Chinese military has a strong commitment to civilian
rescue operations.
International cooperation
is another matter, as the Chinese military seems to regard the outside world
with varying degrees of hostility and suspicion and is probably more secretive
than any other major Asian military except North Korea’s. For example, if it
had intelligence from a sensitive source, it would be at least very careful in
sharing the information.